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“You Say Nano, We Say No-No:” 
Getting a “Yes” Instead for Special 
Economic Zones in India 
Sumeet Jain* 
Abstract: Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have the potential to be valuable in-
struments of economic growth and development in India.  Yet, as a result of the 
resistance facing them, SEZs in India have not delivered economic benefits to 
their fullest potential.  For this reason, reducing the resistance facing SEZs is 
critical to their success.  This article seeks to reduce this resistance by devising 
a consensus-building plan based on a regulatory negotiation approach.  The ar-
ticle first shows that the past and present resistance facing India’s economic 
zones is a product of the lack of public input in the design of their policy.  It then 
presents a platform for understanding the proponents’ and opponents’ argu-
ments by distilling the current legislation and regulation governing India’s SEZ 
policy into a cohesive operational framework.  Next, the article examines pro-
ponents’ and opponents’ arguments pertaining to the operational framework of 
the SEZ policy.  Finally, the article seeks to retroactively counterbalance the 
lack of public input in the design process of India’s SEZ policy by suggesting 
two sets of reforms to the operational framework.  One set of reforms—
procedural reforms—suggests securing greater opponent involvement in the es-
tablishment and operation of SEZs.  The other set—substantive reforms—
recommends rules that will further opponent interests through, not despite, the 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[Y]ou say Nano, we say no-no,” bellowed Mamata Banerjee, a prom-
inent leftist politician1 in West Bengal,2 during a protest aimed at halting 
production of Tata Motors’ Nano.3  The protest against the production of 
the Tata Nano was directed at the establishment of the factory in Singur, 
West Bengal.4  Tata Motors’ Singur facility was established in a Special 
 
1 Leftists’ concerns in India are represented not only by well-known leftist political par-
ties, such as the Communist Party of India (Marxist), but also a broad spectrum of non-
political organizations and individuals.  Leftists place a heavy emphasis on economic egali-
tarianism, and, as a result, often oppose unchecked capitalism and globalization.  Leftists in 
India particularly disapprove of the “land grabs” and displacement that accompany SEZs.  
Nivedita Menon, ‘End of the Left’ in India?  Statement by Leftists After Recent Election Re-
sults, KAFILA (May 24, 2011), http://kafila.org/2011/05/ 24/end-of-the-left-in-india-
statement-after-recent-election-results/; see also Cash Cows, ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 2006, at 
45–46, available at http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id 
=E1_RDPTNTJ. 
2 See Biography of Mamata Banerjee, ALL INDIA TRINAMOOL CONGRESS, 
http://www.aitmc.org/theleaderspeaks.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2011). 
3 Mehul Srivastava, For Tata in India: Industry vs. Farms, BUS. WK. (Aug. 27, 2008, 
12:16 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_36/b4098000380054.htm.  
Priced at U.S. $2,500 and dubbed the “People’s Car,” the Nano is Tata Motors’ most eagerly 
awaited project.  Id. 
4 Mehul Srivastava, Why Indian Farmers are Fighting Tata’s Nano, BUS. WK. (Aug. 27, 
2008, 10:06 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/aug2008/gb20080827 
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Economic Zone (SEZ),5 an area where economic incentives are offered to 
investors with the objective of attracting investment.6  Ultimately, the pro-
tests forced Tata Motors to abandon plans to manufacture the Nano in Sin-
gur.7 
Sadly, the protest in Singur is only one of several high-profile protests 
against India’s SEZs.8  These protests have a twofold detrimental effect on 
the country’s SEZ policy.  First, social barriers, such as threats to safety, 
mounted by the protests undercut the economic benefits that SEZ legisla-
tion and regulation provide.9  Second, political pressure generated by the 
protests leads to legislative and regulatory uncertainty that undermines legal 
predictability and economic stability in SEZs.10  As a result of the social 
barriers and legislative and regulatory uncertainty plaguing them, India’s 
SEZs have not delivered economic benefits to their fullest potential.11 
In light of these dynamics, addressing the cause of these problems—
the popular resistance facing SEZs—is critical to the success of India’s 
SEZs.  The popular resistance facing India’s SEZs is largely a product of 
 
_001413.htm.  The protesters demand that Tata Motors return the 400 acres of land requisi-
tioned for the Singur factory to local farmers.  Talks over Tata Nano Car Deadlock, BBC 
NEWS (Sept. 5, 2008, 3:12 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/ 7599466.stm. 
5 Tata May Bid Adieu to Singur SEZ, INDIAN REALTY NEWS (Aug. 31, 2008), 
http://www.indianrealtynews.com/sezs-india/tata-may-bid-adieu-to-singur-sez.html. 
6 Kwan Yiu Wong & David K.Y. Chu, Export Processing Zones and Special Economic 
Zones as Generators of Economic Development: The Asian Experience, 66 GEOGRAFISKA 
ANNALER:  SERIES B, HUM. GEOGRAPHY 1, 3 (1984). 
7 Tata Abandons Cheapest Car Plant, BBC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2008, 3:45 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7651119.stm (Ratan Tata, Chairman of Tata Group, 
stated, “[w]e have little choice but to move out of Bengal.”). 
8 Protests against SEZs have occurred nationwide.  See, e.g., NANDIGRAM:  WHAT 
REALLY HAPPENED? (2007), available at http://insafindia.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/07/nandi.pdf (Nandigram, West Bengal in March 2007); Farmers 
Block Traffic on NH8 in Protest against Gurgaon SEZ, ONEINDIA NEWS (May 13, 2007, 9:09 
PM), http://news.oneindia.in/2007/ 05/13/farmers-block-traffic-on-nh8-in-protest-against-
gurgaon-sez-1179070736.html (Gurgaon, Haryana in July 2008); Satish Nandgaonkar, Land 
Protest in Maharashtra, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 5, 2008), 
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1081005/jsp/nation/story _9929646.jsp (Raigad, Maharash-
tra in October 2008); Raju Nayak, Goa Protests Can Dampen New Year Party, EXPRESS 
INDIA (Dec. 27, 2007) http://www.indianexpress.com/ news/goa-protests-can-dampen-new-
year-party/254583 (Panjim, Goa in December 2007); Protest Against Coastal Zone Notifica-
tion, THE HINDU (Aug. 10, 2007), http://www.hindu.com/2007/08/10/stories/ 
2007081061370900.htm (Cuddalore, Tamil Nadu in August 2007). 
9 See infra text accompanying note 78. 
10 See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
11 See Lauren Fulton, India’s Way: Crafting Special Economic Zones, 28 HARV. INT’L 
REV., Winter 2007, at 7, available at http://hir.harvard.edu/ethnic-conflict/indias-way (“India 
has great potential to achieve further prosperity.  An effective SEZ program will draw more 
funding from the private sector for infrastructure improvement and generate more employ-
ment opportunities for its large population.”). 
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the lack of public input in the design of the policy.12  This article seeks to 
retroactively counterbalance the lack of public input in the design process 
of India’s SEZ policy by devising a consensus-building plan based on a 
regulatory negotiation approach.  In so doing, this article is comprised of 
four parts.  Part I tracks the historical failure of economic zones13 in India 
arising out of autocratic rulemaking by the Central Government.  Part II 
presents a platform for understanding the proponents’ and opponents’ ar-
guments by distilling the current legislation and regulation governing In-
dia’s SEZ policy into a cohesive operational framework.  Part III examines 
proponents’ and opponents’ arguments pertaining to the operational frame-
work of the SEZ policy.  Part IV seeks to reconcile these views by suggest-
ing two sets of consensus-building reforms to the operational framework.  
The first set of reforms—procedural reforms—focuses on securing greater 
opponent involvement in the establishment and operation of SEZs.  The se-
cond set of reforms—substantive reforms—focuses on introducing rules 
that will further opponent interests through, not despite, the establishment 
and operation of SEZs. 
I.  TROUBLED HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ZONES IN INDIA 
Autocratic rulemaking by the Central Government, characterized by a 
lack of public input, over India’s policy on economic zones is largely cul-
pable for their lack of success.  Initially, under India’s socialist economic 
mandate, economic zones were employed without consideration of com-
mercial feasibility.  Presently, under India’s recent neoliberal economic 
mandate, economic zones are being employed without regard for leftist 
concerns.  This centralized rulemaking is a common hallmark throughout 
the history of India’s economic zone policy.  To date, the Indian experience 
with economic zones can be divided into four periods: (i) 1965–1977, (ii) 
1977–1991, (iii) 1991–2000, and (iv) 2000 onwards.  As a result of central-
ized rulemaking in each period, success has eluded India’s economic zones. 
A.  1965–1977:  The Initial Experiment with Economic Zones 
The Indian government’s disregard for pro-business interests contrib-
 
12 See Sonila Swaminathan, People’s Memorandum on Special Economic Zones in India, 
FOCUS ON THE GLOBAL SOUTH—INDIA PROGRAMME (Sept. 13, 2006, 2:38 AM), 
http://focusweb.org/india/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=830 [hereinafter 
People’s Memorandum on SEZs in India]. 
13 “Economic zone” is the general term used to describe an area in which the government 
gives businesses incentives to engage in various types of economic activity.  AMITENDU 
PALIT & SUBHOMOY BHATTACHARJEE, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN INDIA: MYTHS AND 
REALITIES 3 (2008).  This term encompasses (i) special economic zones (SEZs), (ii) export 
processing zones (EPZs), (iii) industrial zones, (iv) enterprise zones, (v) information pro-
cessing zones, (vi) financial services zones, (vii) commercial free zones, and (viii) free ports.  
Id. at 4–6. 
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uted to the failure of the country’s first economic zones.  India’s initial ex-
perimentation with economic zones was chiefly a product of Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru’s socialist legacy.14  Under Nehru, the government adopt-
ed a plan of self-sufficient industrialization.15  This plan was implemented 
by adopting a model of import-substitution industrialization (ISI)16—a set 
of trade protectionist measures aimed at developing domestic industry.17  
Specifically, India employed an outward-looking ISI model—a set of 
measures aimed at developing domestic industry by simultaneously restrict-
ing imports and promoting exports.18  The government restricted imports by 
requiring “scrutiny and approval by the Central Government of every indi-
vidual case of participation [of] foreign capital and management in indus-
try.”19  At the same time, it boosted exports through a “systematic pro-
 
14 The tone of India’s socialist economy was set shortly before India’s independence in 
1947.  The “Bombay Plan” of 1945, a set of proposals from leading Indian industrialists for 
the development of India’s post-independence economy, suggested that “the State should 
exercise in the interests of the community a considerable measure of intervention and con-
trol.”  PURSHOTAMDAS THAKURDAS ET AL., MEMORANDUM OUTLINING A PLAN OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT FOR INDIA (PARTS ONE AND TWO) 90 (1945).  India’s post-independence eco-
nomic policy followed the Bombay Plan’s call for a socialist economy.  The preamble of the 
Constitution of India, promulgated in 1950, defines India as a “socialist . . . republic.”  INDIA 
CONST. pmbl.  Consistent with this preambular mandate, Article 39, a directive principle of 
state policy, requires the state to ensure that “ownership and control of the material resources 
of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good” and “operation of 
the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production 
to the common detriment.”  Id. at art. 39(b)–(c).  To achieve these ends, Jawaharlal Nehru, 
the first Prime Minister of India, declared it necessary to “make the State more and more the 
organizer of constructive industry, and not the private capitalist or anyone else.”  Jawaharlal 
Nehru, Prime Minister of India, The Only Right Approach, Speech Delivered at the Constit-
uent Assembly (Legislative) (Apr. 7, 1948), in JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, INDEPENDENCE AND 
AFTER: A COLLECTION OF SPEECHES 1946–1949 175 (2d ed. 1971).  Under the initial chair-
manship of Nehru, India’s economic plans were laid out in “seemingly socialistic” Five-Year 
Plans.  Jona Aravind Dohrmann, Special Economic Zones in India—An Introduction, 106 
ASIEN 60, 61 (2008); see also Asoka Mehta, Jawaharlal Nehru—Social Justice and Na-
tional Development, in INDIAN ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND DEVELOPMENT 3, 5–6 (Ashok V. 
Bhuleshkar ed., 1969).  The coupling of Nehru’s socialist economic policies with Gandhi’s 
model of swadesi—self-reliance—made striving for self-sufficient industrialization the 
hallmark of Indian economic policies in the years following independence.  Dohrmann, su-
pra, at 61.  India’s movement for self-sufficient industrialization resulted in protectionism of 
domestic industry through “legally comprehensive” government controls over foreign trade. 
B.R. SHENOY, INDIAN ECONOMIC POLICY 49 (1968). 
15 JALEEL AHMAD, IMPORT SUBSTITUTION, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 3 (Edward I. Alt-
man & Ingo Walter eds., 1978). 
16 Aradhna Aggarwal, Performance of Export Processing Zones: A Comparative Analysis 
of India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh 7 (Indian Council for Research on Int’l Econ. Relations, 
Working Paper No. 155, 2005), available at http://www.icrier.org/pdf/wp155.pdf. 
17 AHMAD, supra note 15, at 3. 
18 Aggarwal, supra note 16, at 7. 
19 GOV’T OF INDIA, INDUSTRIAL POLICY RESOLUTION ¶ 10 (1948), available at 
http://www.dcmsme.gov.in/policies/iip.htm. 
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gramme” of export promotion.20 
India first employed economic zones under this systematic program of 
export promotion.  These first economic zones were categorized as Export 
Processing Zones (EPZs), a type of economic zone aimed at incentivizing 
investors to participate in export businesses.21  EPZs achieved this objective 
by providing a variety of fiscal incentives to export-oriented businesses, 
such as exemption from import duty on raw materials and capital goods.22  
Asia’s first EPZ was established in 1965 in Kandla (Gujarat).23  In 1973, the 
Indian government launched a second EPZ in Mumbai (Maharashtra).24  
Unfortunately, the cumbersome nature of the EPZ policy made painfully 
obvious the lack of input from pro-business constituents.  First, the fiscal 
incentives and the facilities offered for operating in EPZs were not attrac-
tive enough to motivate investors to participate.25  Second, a highly central-
ized structure in which zone authorities had “limited powers” led to a rigid 
and nonnegotiable system.26  Third, entrepreneurs had to acquire multiple 
individual clearances before beginning operations.27  Fourth, “[d]ay-to-day 
operations were subjected to rigorous controls.”28  In particular, the Central 
Government’s restrictions on imports, which in turn restricted the importa-
tion of foreign capital, suffocated growth in EPZs.29  Consequently, “EPZs 
 
[W]hile it should be industrial that participation of foreign capital and enterprise, 
particularly as regards industrial technique and knowledge, will be of value to the 
rapid industrialization of the country, it is necessary that the conditions under 
which they may participate in Indian industry should be carefully regulated in the 
national interest. Suitable legislation will be introduced for this purpose.  Such 
Legislation will provide for the scrutiny and approval by the Central Government 
of every individual case of participation [of] foreign capital and management in 
industry.   
Id. 
20 PLANNING COMM’N, THIRD FIVE YEAR PLAN ch. 8, ¶ 10 (1961) (India), available at 
http://planningcommission.gov.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/3rd/3planch8.html. 
21 PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 4. 
22 CENT. BD. OF EXCISE & CUSTOMS, MINISTRY OF FIN., EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE 
SCHEME (India) [hereinafter EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE SCHEME], available at 
http://121.241.246.157/customs/cs-manual/manual_22%28c%29.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 
2011). 
23 SEZ DIV., MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUS., GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPMENT OF 
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES (SEZS) 2 (Oct 27, 2010) (India) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR 
DEVELOPMENT OF SEZS], available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/Instructions/ 
Instruction%20No.65.pdf. 





29 MINISTRY OF ENVT & FORESTS, TECHNICAL EIA GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR INDUSTRIAL 
ESTATES, annexure II at ii (2009) (India), available at http://moef.nic.in/Manuals/ 
TGM_Industrial%20Estates.pdf (“there were insular policies, focused on import minimiza-
“You Say Nano, We Say No-No” 
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were not able to emerge as effective instruments for export promotion on 
account of multiplicity of controls and clearances, absence of world-class 
infrastructure and an unstable fiscal regime.”30  A lack of input from pro-
business constituents largely shoulders the blame for the commercial infea-
sibility of the EPZ policy. 
B.  1977–1991:  Increasing Reliance on EPZs 
A disregard for pro-business interests in the EPZ policy persisted be-
tween 1977 and 1991.  In the first half of this period, the government ap-
pointed various committees to review the performance of EPZs.31  These 
committees correctly identified many of the handicaps facing the EPZ poli-
cy, notably infrastructural deficiencies and a lack of access to foreign raw 
materials and capital.32  The committees even made “several concrete rec-
ommendations” to improve the performance of the EPZs.33  Still, the policy 
regime remained “virtually static.”34 
Later during this period, however, the government relaxed import re-
strictions.  Fueled by India’s failure to significantly increase export volume 
through ISI policies, official thinking in the late 1970s began veering round 
to the view that ISI could no longer deliver satisfactory economic growth.35  
Instead, policy-makers believed that export-oriented industrialization (EOI), 
an outward policy of encouraging exports and removing import re-
strictions,36 held far greater potential.37  The belief that ISI policies should 
be replaced by EOI policies originated from the thought that import liberal-
ization would aid export promotion by facilitating the infusion of foreign 
technologies and capital into domestic industry.38  Thus, transitioning from 
 
tion (vs. trade enhancement through export promotion)”). 
30 K. NARINDAR JETLI & VISHAL SETHI, INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA: POST-
LIBERALISATION INITIATIVES AND CHALLENGES 117 (2007).  FDI policy was especially re-
strictive.  In fact, according to the Business Environment Rating Index, a ranking of invest-
ment climate in forty-three countries, Indian EPZs placed last for FDI.  Aggarwal, supra 
note 16, at 7. 
31 Aggarwal, supra note 16, at 8. 
32 See id.  (The committees identified several handicaps: “the absence of a policy, ab-
sence of implementation authority to centrally co-ordinate and control the zones, procedural 
constraints, infrastructural deficiencies, limited concessions and limited powers of the zone 
authorities to take actions on the spot resulting in inordinate delays.”). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 B. Uday Shankar, Some Recent Trends in the Indian Economy, SOC. SCIENTIST, Dec. 
1982, at 32, 33. 
36 KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 442–43 (7th ed. 
2004). 
37 See Shankar, supra note 35, at 33. 
38 See GOV’T OF INDIA, INDUSTRIAL POLICY STATEMENT ¶ 15 (1977), available at 
http://www.dcmsme.gov.in/policies/iip.htm [hereinafter INDUSTRIAL POLICY STATEMENT 
(1977)]. 
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an outward-looking ISI framework to an EOI one, the Industrial Policy 
Statement of 1977 advanced import liberalization39 and vigorous export 
promotion.40  To promote exports, the government vowed to consider “fa-
vourable proposals” from private investors to enhance export-oriented man-
ufacturing capacity, such as establishing EPZs.41  Accordingly, the govern-
ment approved the establishment of four more EPZs in 1984 in Noida 
(Uttar Pradesh), Falta (West Bengal), Cochin (Kerala), and Chennai (Tamil 
Nadu).42 
However, falling victim to the unchanged burdensome laws that hin-
dered the progress of the Kandla and Mumbai EPZs,43 none of the EPZs es-
tablished in 1984 were successful at export promotion.44  As an additional 
means to promote exports, the Industrial Policy Statement of 1980 suggest-
ed the supplementary strategy of “sympathetically consider[ing] requests 
for setting up 100% export oriented units” (EOUs).45  This scheme accorded 
individual EOUs the flexibility to be established beyond the boundaries of 
EPZs, while still receiving fiscal benefits46 provided to units in EPZs.47  
However, since EOUs were also subject to the burdensome laws governing 
EPZs, “striking success . . . eluded” the EOU scheme as well.48  Although 
import restrictions were loosened, the same cumbersome controls and clear-
ances that burdened India’s first EPZs continued to hamper the EPZ and 
EOU schemes.  The continued use of commercially infeasible EPZ and 
EOU policies suggests that a lack of input from pro-business constituents 
 
39 See id. (“[T]he progress that we have made in the industrial field should now enable us 
to selectively dispense with import quotas and quantitative restrictions, while retaining the 
protection given through tariffs.”); see also Shankar, supra note 35, at 33. 
40 See INDUSTRIAL POLICY STATEMENT (1977), supra note 38, ¶ 16. 
Exports of manufactures are an important and growing segment of our export 
trade.  Government will consider favourable proposals for export-oriented manu-
facturing capacity in fields where such investment is likely to be internationally 
competitive . . . .  In the case of wholly export-based activities, Government will 
also be willing to consider exemption from customs/excise duties on inputs . . . . 
Id.  See also Shankar, supra note 35, at 33. 
41 See INDUSTRIAL POLICY STATEMENT (1977), supra note 38, ¶ 16. 
42 Aggarwal, supra note 16, at 8. 
43 See supra text accompanying note 30. 
44 See Aggarwal, supra note 16, at 8. 
45 GOV’T OF INDIA, INDUSTRIAL POLICY STATEMENT ¶ 23 (1980), available at 
http://www.dcmsme.gov.in/policies/iip.htm. 
46 See EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE SCHEME, supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
47 CENT. BD. OF EXCISE & CUSTOMS, MINISTRY OF FIN., EXPORT ORIENTED UNIT SCHEME 
(India), available at http://121.241.246.157/customs/cs-manual/manual_22%28b%29.htm 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2011).  Since most of the six EPZs in India were located in “industrial-
ly backward regions,” EOUs had an incentive to establish their facilities beyond the bounda-
ries of existing EPZs.  See Aggarwal, supra note 16, at 8. 
48 1 PLANNING COMM’N, SEVENTH FIVE YEAR PLAN ¶ 6.45 (1985) (India), available at 
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/7th/vol1/7v1ch6.html. 




C.  1991–2000:  Liberalizing EPZs 
As part of a massive dose of liberalization in 1991, the Indian govern-
ment tried to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by restructuring the 
EPZ policy without regard for leftist concerns.  When India’s economy felt 
the ripple effects of the Gulf War, the Indian government sought loans from 
the World Bank.49  In return, the World Bank demanded liberalization of 
the Indian economy.50  Ultimately, India was forced to adopt a set of free 
market policies in 1991.51  These free market policies gave rise to a new 
understanding that attracting FDI was “in the interest of the country’s in-
dustrial development.”52  As India’s economic agenda towards EOI trans-
formed from a grudging acceptance to a full embrace, the 1991 Statement 
of Industrial Policy maintained import liberalization, maintained export 
promotion, and relaxed restrictions over FDI.53  Additionally, as part of a 
set of measures aimed at attracting FDI, the government broadened the 
scope of the EPZ and EOU schemes in 1992, 1994, and 1996.  In 1992, the 
EPZ and EOU schemes were broadened to include the agriculture, horticul-
ture, and aqua-culture sectors.54  In 1994, these schemes were further ex-
panded to include trading, re-engineering, and reconditioning units.55  In 
1996, the EPZ and EOU schemes were once again enlarged to include in-
frastructure, non-conventional energy, electronics, software, and a few other 
sectors having a significant export potential.56  During this period of liberal-
ization, leftist interests were left vulnerable to full-blown proliferation of 
EPZs and EOUs. 
 
49 Dohrmann, supra note 14, at 62.  The Indian government was prompted to seek loans 
from the World Bank only upon reaching near insolvency after foreign transfers from the 
Gulf Region dried up.  Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 GOV’T OF INDIA, STATEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY ¶ 24 (1991), available at 
http://www.dcmsme.gov.in/policies/iip.htm.  The Government of India welcomed foreign 
investment, reasoning that it would bring the “attendant advantages” of technology transfer, 
marketing expertise, introduction of modern managerial techniques, and new possibilities for 
promotion of exports.  Id. 
53 Id. ¶¶ 24–26.  To invite FDI in “high priority industries, requiring large investments 
and advanced technology,” the 1991 Statement of Industrial Policy granted automatic ap-
proval for (i) FDI in these select industries, so long as the total foreign investment in the in-
dustry was not greater than 51%, and (ii) technology agreements related to high priority in-
dustries within specified parameters.  Id. ¶¶ 25, 28. 
54 Aggarwal, supra note 16, at 9. 
55 Id. 
56 2 PLANNING COMM’N, NINTH FIVE YEAR PLAN, ¶ 5.4 (1997) (India), available at 
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/9th/vol2/v2c5.htm. 
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D.  2000–Present: The Emergence of SEZs 
The Central Government continued to ignore leftist interests as the 
EPZ scheme was replaced with the SEZ scheme.  India’s EPZ scheme 
evolved into the current SEZ scheme out of the realization that attracting 
FDI required India to develop “well-functioning infrastructure.”57  In early 
2000, Murasoli Maran, India’s then-Minister of Commerce and Industry, 
visited SEZs in China.58  Inspired by the infrastructural developments that 
SEZs generated in China, Mr. Maran introduced the concept of SEZs to the 
Indian economy in March 2000 through the annual update to the Export and 
Import (EXIM) Policy of 1997–2002.59  Section 9A.1 of the updated EXIM 
Policy of 1997–2002 defines an SEZ as “a specifically delineated duty free 
enclave [which] shall be deemed to be foreign territory for the purposes of 
trade operations and duties and tariffs.”60  A fairly detailed set of guidelines, 
including provisions relating to a proposed administrative regime, follow 
this definition.61 
The Foreign Trade Policy (FT Policy) of 2004–2009 echoed the provi-
sions listed in the updated EXIM Policy of 1997–2002.62  Under both the 
updated EXIM Policy of 1997–2002 and FT Policy of 2004–2009, incen-
tives and other facilities were offered to SEZ developers and SEZ units on 
an ad hoc basis “through various notification[s] and circulars issued by the 
concerned [Ministries and Departments].”63  This procedure did not inspire 
confidence in investors to commit resources to SEZs.64  To provide legal 
predictability, India’s Parliament saw the need to legitimize and streamline 
SEZ guidelines and procedures through legislation.65 
 
57 Dohrmann, supra note 14, at 62.  Note, however, that the EOU scheme continues to 
operate separately from the SEZ scheme.  PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 129. 
58 P. ARUNACHALAM, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN INDIA: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS AND 
PROSPECTS 1–2 (2008). 
59 Id. at 2.  See also DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUS., EXPORT 
AND IMPORT POLICY ch.  9A (1997, update effective Apr. 1, 2000) (India) [hereinafter 
UPDATED EXIM POLICY (1997)], available at http://exim.indiamart.com/indian-exim-
policy/special-economic-zones.html. 
60 UPDATED EXIM POLICY (1997), supra note 59, ch. 9A.1. 
61 See id. ch. 9A.  The updated EXIM Policy of 1997–2002 lays out the structure of how 
the central and state governments shall approve applications for SEZs, and how they shall 
monitor performance of these zones.  See id. ch. 9A.5–9A.7. 
62 See generally DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUS., FOREIGN 
TRADE POLICY ch. 7 (2004) (India), available at http://dgftcom.nic.in/exim/2000/policy/ 
chap-07.htm. 
63 Press Release, Dep’t of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Indus., SEZ Bill to 
Give a Big Push to Exports and FDI (May 10, 2005), http://commerce.nic. 
in/pressrelease/pressrelease_detail.asp?id=1492 (India). 
64 Id. 
65 Id.  (“To provide a long-term and stable policy . . . , a Central Act for Special Econom-
ic Zones [was] found to be necessary in line with international practice.”); GUIDELINES FOR 
DEVELOPMENT OF SEZS, supra note 23, at 2 (SEZ legislation and regulation was passed with 
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In May 2005,66 the Parliament of India passed the Special Economic 
Zones Act (SEZ Act)67 to “provide for the establishment, development and 
management of the Special Economic Zones . . . .”68  The SEZ Act received 
presidential assent, and thereby came into force in June 2005.69  Section 55 
of the SEZ Act permits the Central Government to promulgate rules for car-
rying out the provisions of the Act.70  Accordingly, the Central Government 
passed the Special Economic Zones Rules71 (SEZ Rules) on February 10, 
2006 to carry out the provisions of the SEZ Act.72  The Central Government 
designed this legislation and regulation largely without public input.73  Still, 
by September 2010, 585 SEZs had been formally approved74 and forty-two 
SEZs had earned in-principal approval75 under the SEZ Act.  Additionally, 
the existing EPZs were converted into SEZs.76 
However, following the lack of public input in India’s SEZ policy, the 
policy faces nationwide protests.77  These protests have a twofold detri-
mental effect on the SEZ policy.  First, social barriers, such as threats to 
safety, mounted by the protests against SEZs undercut the economic bene-
fits that SEZ legislation and regulation provide.  Ratan Tata, Chairman of 
Tata Group, explained that Tata Motors had to abandon its Singur facility 
 
an intent to “signal the Government’s commitment to a stable SEZ regime . . . .”). 
66 Dep’t of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Indus., Introduction to SEZs in India, 
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN INDIA, http://www.sezindia.nic.in/about-introduction.asp (In-
dia) (last visited Nov. 30, 2011). 
67 Special Economic Zones Act, No. 28 of 2005, INDIA CODE (2011), available at 
http://indiacode.nic.in. 
68 Id. pmbl.  See also GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPMENT OF SEZS, supra note 23, at 2. 
69 Special Economic Zones Act, pmbl (India). 
70 Id. § 55. 
71 Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Feb. 10, 2006), 
available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/SEZ_Rules_July_2010.pdf. 
72 Id. 
73 People’s Memorandum on SEZs in India, supra note 12 (“The SEZ Act was passed in 
haste without much public debate.  There was no public consultation; participation and de-
bate on the SEZ Act facilitated by the Ministry.  Even in Rajya Sabha the Upper House of 
Indian Democracy has passed this bill with a one day discussion undermining many of the 
objections.”). 
74 Dep’t of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Indus., List of Formal Approvals 
Granted under SEZ Act, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN INDIA, http://www.sezindia.nic. 
in/writereaddata/pdf/ListofFormalapprovals.pdf (India) (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) [herein-
after List of Formal SEZ Approvals Granted]. 
75 Dep’t of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Indus., List of In-principal Approvals 
Granted under SEZ Act, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN INDIA, http://www.sezindia.nic.in/ 
writereaddata/pdf/Listofin-principleapprovals.pdf (India) (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) [here-
inafter List of In-Principal SEZ Approvals Granted]. 
76 G. Srinivasan, Special Economic Zone Act: ‘Provides the Right Combination of Facili-
ties,’ THE HINDU BUSINESS LINE (Nov. 29, 2005), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/ 
2005/11/29/stories/2005112902031100.htm. 
77 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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because it “[could not] run a factory with police around all the time.”78  
Thus, despite the preferential economic treatment offered to investors in 
SEZs, social barriers render operating in SEZs prohibitively inefficient.  
Second, political pressure generated by the protests against SEZs leads to 
legislative and regulatory uncertainty that undermines legal predictability 
and economic stability in SEZs.  In response to widespread protests, the In-
dian government has frequently revised India’s SEZ policy.  In the five 
years since the SEZ Rules have come into effect, there have been thirteen 
amendments.79  More disturbingly, the SEZ policy was placed on a “go-
slow”80 upon recommendation by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on 
Commerce to suspend approvals.81  Such legislative and regulatory uncer-
 
78 Tata Abandons Cheapest Car Plant, supra note 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
79 See Special Economic Zones (Amendment) Rules, 2006, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) 
(Aug. 10, 2006), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/dated-10-8-06-
amending-sez-rules06.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Second Amendment) Rules, 2007, 
GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(ii) (Mar. 16, 2007), available at http://www.sezindia.nic. 
in/writereaddata/rules/sez-snd-amend-rules2007.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Second 
Amendment) Rules, 2007, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(ii) (Oct. 12, 2007), available at 
http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/Third_Amendment-3rd_October_2007.pdf; 
Special Economic Zones (Amendment) Rules, 2008, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(ii) (Nov. 14, 
2008), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/SEZRules2008 
_Amendment_.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Amendment) Rules, 2009, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § 
II(3)(i) (Feb. 3, 2009), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/ 
rules/SpecialEconomicZone%20_Amendment_%20Rules2009.pdf; Special Economic Zones 
(Second Amendment) Rules, 2009, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(ii) (May 20, 2009), available 
at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/SezRules2009%20_ SecondAmend-
ment.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Third Amendment) Rules, 2009, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § 
II(3)(i) (Aug. 3, 2009), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/ 
rules/Final3_Rule_Amendment.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Amendment) Rules, 2010, 
GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (June 14, 2010), available at http://www.sezindia.nic. 
in/writereaddata/rules/SEZ_Rule_amendment_10.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Second 
Amendment) Rules, 2010, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (July 12, 2010), available at 
http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/rules1.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Third 
Amendment) Rules, 2010, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Sept. 7, 2010), available at 
http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/rules2.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Fourth 
Amendment) Rules, 2010, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Sept. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/Rule4.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Fifth 
Amendment) Rules, 2010, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Nov. 10, 2010), available at 
http://sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/Rule5.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Sixth Amend-
ment) Rules, 2010, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Dec. 16, 2010), available at 
http://sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/Rule6.pdf. 
80 Govt to Go Slow on IT SEZ Approval, TIMES OF INDIA (Nov. 8, 2006, 11:37 PM), 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/374329.cms. 
81 In its eighty-third report, the Parliamentary Standing Committee Report “recom-
mend[ed] that no further SEZs should be notified till the SEZ Act and the Rules made there-
under have been amended to meet the public concerns with regard to various provisions con-
tained in the said Act and Rules.” DEP’T RELATED PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMM. ON 
COMMERCE, PARLIAMENT OF INDIA, EIGHTY THIRD REPORT ON THE FUNCTIONING OF SPECIAL 
ECONOMIC ZONES ¶ 6.5 (2007), available at http://164.100.47.5/newcommittee/reports 
/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20Commerce/Report%20SEZ1.htm.  In its eighty-
“You Say Nano, We Say No-No” 
32:1 (2011) 
13 
tainty undermines the economic stability and legal predictability that is 
supposed to attract investment in SEZs in the first place.82  As a result of the 
social barriers and the legislative and regulatory uncertainty facing them, 
SEZs in India have not delivered economic benefits to their fullest poten-
tial.  Ultimately, the lack of public input in the operational framework, and 
the ensuing protests, restrict SEZs in India from realizing their economic 
potential.83 
II.  OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SEZS 
The SEZ Act and SEZ Rules together create an operational framework 
for SEZs that can be divided into three stages.  Initially, the SEZ Developer 
(Developer)84 must earn approval for a proposed SEZ.  Next, the Developer 
must transform the approved SEZ into an operating entity by securing land 
and SEZ Units (Units).85  Finally, as the SEZ becomes operational, Devel-
opers and Units may begin to take advantage of incentives associated with 
SEZs. 
A.  The Approval Process for SEZs 
SEZs may be established jointly or severally by the Central Govern-
ment, a state government, or any private entity.86  The application procedure 
varies for each of these prospective Developers.  A private entity may sub-
 
seventh report, the next report pertaining to SEZs, the Parliamentary Standing Committee 
regretfully noted that the Government approved and notified some SEZs despite the Com-
mittee’s recommendation in the eighty-third report to suspend the policy altogether. DEP’T 
RELATED PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMM. ON COMMERCE, PARLIAMENT OF INDIA, EIGHTY 
SEVENTH REPORT ON ACTION TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS/ 
OBSERVATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE CONTAINED IN ITS 83RD REPORT ON THE FUNCTIONING OF 
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES (SEZS) ¶ 6.5 (2008), available at http://164.100.47.5 
/newcommittee/reports/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20Commerce/87th%20repor
t.htm.  The Committee proceeded to reiterate its recommendation to suspend the SEZ policy.  
Id. 
82 Shaveta Gupta, Special Economic Zones: A Smoldering Issue, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC 
ZONES: GLOBAL AND INDIAN EXPERIENCES 241, 242, 246–47 (Prabha Shastri Ranade ed., 
2007); see also Sunil Bharti Mittal, Founder, Chairman, and Group Managing Director, 
Bharti Enterprises, India’s New Entrepreneurial Classes: The High Growth Economy and 
Why It Is Sustainable, Remarks at the Annual Lecture at the Center for the Advanced Study 
of India at the University of Pennsylvania (Nov. 10, 2005), available at 
http://casi.ssc.upenn.edu/system/files/Mittal_2006.pdf (“I personally believe that for an en-
trepreneur the important need is stable policies . . . .”). 
83 Fulton, supra note 11. 
84 A “Developer” is a private entity or state government that has been granted a letter of 
approval to develop an SEZ.  Special Economic Zones Act, No. 28 of 2005, § 2(g), INDIA 
CODE (2011), available at http://indiacode.nic.in. 
85 A “Unit” is business unit operating within an SEZ.  Id. § 2(zc). 
86 Id. § 3(1). 
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mit a proposal either to the Board of Approval (Board)87 or to a state gov-
ernment.88  If submitted to a state government, the government must for-
ward the private entity’s proposal and its recommendation to the Board 
within forty-five days from the date of receipt.89  Alternatively, a state gov-
ernment may submit its proposal for an SEZ directly to the Board.90  The 
Central Government cannot independently make and submit an SEZ pro-
posal; but, it may suo moto91 establish an SEZ for which a proposal has 
been previously submitted by a state government.92 
However, an SEZ may only be established upon receiving approval 
from the Board.  The Board is comprised of up to nineteen members.93  
Most of these members are nominated by the Central Government.94  The 
state government where the proposed SEZ is being developed has authority 
to nominate only one member.95  Interestingly, all the acts of the Board are 
decided by a “general consensus of the Members present.”96  Three main 
 
87 Id. § 3(4). 
88 Id. § 3(2). 
89 Id. § 3(6); Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006, §4, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Feb. 
10, 2006), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/SEZ_Rules 
_July_2010.pdf. 
90 Special Economic Zones Act, § 3(4) (India). 
91 “On their or its own initiative, without external prompting or explicit demand.” Suo 
moto Definition, WORDWEB ONLINE, http://www.wordwebonline.com/en/SUOMOTO (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2011). 
92 Special Economic Zones Act, § 3(4) (India). 
93 Id. §§ 8(2)(a)–8(2)(i). 
94 The Central Government has the authority to nominate: (i) a Chairperson, “an officer 
not below the rank of an Additional Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry or 
Department of the Central Government dealing with Commerce;” (ii) two Members, “offic-
ers not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India nominated . . . to rep-
resent the Ministry or Department of the Central [Government] dealing with revenue;” (iii) a 
Member, an “officer not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India to be 
nominated to represent the Ministry or Department of the Central [Government] dealing with 
economic affairs;” (iv) up to ten Members, officers “not below the rank of a Joint Secretary 
to the Government of India” nominated “to represent the Ministry or Department of the Cen-
tral Government dealing with commerce, industrial policy and promotion, science and tech-
nology, small scale industries and agro and rural industries, home affairs, defense, environ-
ment and forests, law, overseas Indian affairs and urban development;” (v) a Member, “a 
nominee of the State Government concerned;” (vi) a Member, “the Director General of For-
eign Trade or his nominee;” (vii) a Member, “the Development Commissioner concerned;” 
(viii) a Member, either a Professor from the Indian Institute of Management or the Indian 
Institute of Foreign Trade; and (iix) a Member, “an officer not below the rank of Deputy 
Secretary to the Government of India dealing with [SEZs] in the Ministry or Department of 
the Central Government dealing with commerce.  Id. §§ 8(2)(a)–8(2)(i). 
95 Id. § 8(2)(e).  Initially, the Central Government did not want state governments to have 
any say in the approval process.  However, to garner the support of the left-wing parties, the 
Central Government allowed one state government nominee to be a member of the Board.  
Dohrmann, supra note 14, at 66. 
96 Special Economic Zones Act, § 8(6) (India). 
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requirements must be met for approval of SEZ proposals.  First, Developers 
are required to meet minimum area requirements.  “SEZs for multi-
product”97 must have at least 1,000 hectares.98  Similarly, “SEZs for specific 
sector”99 must reserve at least 100 hectares.100  Identically, “SEZs in a port 
or airport”101 must reserve at least 100 hectares.102  Second, Developers are 
required to meet minimum processing area requirements.  SEZs for multi-
product,103 SEZs for specific sector,104 and SEZs in a port or airport105 must 
reserve at least 50% of the area for processing activities.  Third, after a 
meeting in September 2006, the Board placed minimum investment re-
quirements upon Developers.106  SEZs for multi-product must show a min-
imum investment of `10,000,000,000 (approximately $195,465,200), or 
minimum net worth of `2,500,000,000 (approximately $48,866,300).  Simi-
larly, SEZs for specific sector must show a minimum investment of 
`2,500,000,000 (approximately $48,866,300), or minimum net worth of 
`500,000,000 (approximately $9,773,260).107 
If the Board approves a proposal, it communicates the approval to the 
 
97 An SEZ for multi-product is an SEZ where Units may be set up for (i) manufacture of 
goods falling in two or more sectors, (ii) rendering of services falling in two or more sectors, 
or (iii) any combination thereof, including trading and warehousing.  Special Economic 
Zones (Amendment) Rules, 2009, § 2, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Feb. 3, 2009), available 
at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/SpecialEconomicZone%20_Amendment_ 
%20Rules2009.pdf. 
98 Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006, § 5(2)(a), GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Feb. 10, 
2006), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/SEZ_Rules_July_2010. 
pdf. 
99 An SEZ for specific sector is an SEZ meant exclusively for one or more (i) products in 
a sector, or (ii) services in a sector.  Id. § 2(1)(zb). 
100 Id. § 5(2)(b). 
101 An SEZ in a port or airport is an SEZ existing in a port or airport for (i) manufacture 
of two or more goods in a sector, (ii) manufacture of goods falling in two or more sectors, 
(iii) trading and warehousing, or (iv) rendering services.  Id. §2(1)(zc). 
102 Id. § 5(2)(b). 
103 Special Economic Zones (Second Amendment) Rules, 2007, § 2, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § 
II(3)(ii) (Oct. 12, 2007), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/ 
Third_Amendment-3rd_October_2007.pdf.  The original SEZ Rules required that SEZs for 
multi-product must reserve only 25% of area for processing activities.  Special Economic 
Zones Rules, 2006 § 5(2)(a) (India).  A prior amendment increased the minimum processing 
area requirement for SEZs for multi-product to 35%, but permitted the Central Government 
to relax the requirement to 25% on recommendation from the Board.  Special Economic 
Zones (Amendment) Rules, 2006, § 2, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Aug. 10, 2006), availa-
ble at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/dated-10-8-06-amending-sezrules06 
.pdf. 
104 Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006, § 5(2)(b) (India). 
105 Id. 
106 PRESS INFO. BUREAU, LIST OF AUTHORISED ACTIVITIES IN NON-PROCESSING AREA OF 
SEZS TO BE NOTIFIED annex 2 (2006) (India), available at http://pib.nic.in/archieve/others 
/2006/sep06/E2006210906.pdf. 
107 Id. 
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Central Government.108  The Central Government must then issue a Letter 
of Approval within thirty days of receiving the approval from the Board to 
either the state government or private entity that submitted the proposal.109  
However, issuance of a formal Letter of Approval does not automatically 
make an SEZ operational. 
B.  Making the SEZ Operational 
SEZs are made operational through a two-step process.  First, the De-
veloper must complete the land acquisition process.  To complete the land 
acquisition process, the Developer must produce a certificate from the state 
government or another authorized agency verifying that the Developer has 
legal possession and irrevocable rights to develop the land and that the land 
is free from all encumbrances.110  Since the SEZ Act is silent on the land 
acquisition regime to be utilized by Developers, the Land Acquisition Act 
of 1894 (Land Acquisition Act), which allows acquisition of land for “pub-
lic purpose” or for “a company,”111 is used to acquire land for SEZs.112  Se-
cond, Units must obtain authorization to operate within the SEZ.  Authori-
zation for various operations occurring within the SEZ is granted by the 
Approval Committee.113  The Approval Committee is comprised of nine 
 
108 Special Economic Zones Act, No. 28 of 2005, § 3(9)(a), INDIA CODE (2011), available 
at http://indiacode.nic.in. 
109 Special Economic Zones (Second Amendment) Rules, 2007, § 4, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § 
II(3)(ii) (Mar. 16, 2007), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/sez-snd-
amend-rules2007.pdf. 
110 Id. § 5. 
111 Land Acquisition Act, No. 1 of 1894, INDIA CODE (2011), available at  
http://indiacode.nic.in. 
112 Dohrmann, supra note 14, at 75.  See PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 105. 
113 The Approval Committee may discharge the following functions: 
(a) approve the import or procurement of goods from the Domestic Tariff Area, in 
the Special Economic Zone for carrying on the authorised operations by a Devel-
oper; (b) approve the providing of services by a service provider, from outside In-
dia, or from the Domestic Tariff Area, for carrying on the authorised operations by 
the Developer, in the Special Economic Zone; (c) monitor the utilisation of goods 
or services or warehousing or trading in the Special Economic Zone; (d) approve, 
modify or reject proposals for setting up Units for manufacturing or rendering ser-
vices or warehousing or trading in the Special Economic Zone [other than the 
grant of licence under clause (e) of sub-section (2) of section 9] in accordance with 
the provisions of sub-section (8) of section 15; (e) allow, on receipt of approval 
under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 9, foreign collaborations and foreign 
direct investments (including investments by a person outside India) for setting up 
a Unit; (f) monitor and supervise compliance of conditions subject to which the 
letter of approval or permission, if any, has been granted to the Developer or en-
trepreneur; and (g) perform such other functions as may be entrusted to it by the 
Central Government or the state government concerned, as the case may be. 
Special Economic Zones Act, No. 28 of 2005, § 14(1), INDIA CODE (2011), available at 
http://indiacode.nic.in. 
“You Say Nano, We Say No-No” 
32:1 (2011) 
17 
members.114  Most of these members are nominated by the Central Gov-
ernment.115  The state government where the proposed SEZ is being devel-
oped has authority to nominate only two members.116  Here, too, all the acts 
of the Approval Committee are decided by a “general consensus of the 
Members present.”117  The Approval Committee bases its decision to ap-
prove the operation of Units on two key elements: the Unit must achieve 
positive net foreign exchange earnings,118 and the Developer must confirm 
the availability of space and infrastructural support demanded by the 
Unit.119 
C.  Incentives Offered by SEZs 
Once an SEZ is operational, the Developers and Units can take ad-
vantage of the incentives offered.  Developers receive fiscal incentives.  
Most notably, Developers receive an exemption from payment of: (i) in-
come tax under Section 80-IAB of the Income Tax Act of 1961 (Income 
Tax Act) for ten consecutive years;120 (ii) Minimum Alternate Tax under 
Section 115JB of the Income Tax Act;121 (iii) service tax under Chapter V 
of the Finance Act of 1994 (Finance Act) on taxable services provided to a 
Developer;122 (iv) sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act of 1956 (Cen-
tral Sales Tax Act) on sale or purchase of goods;123 (v) customs duty under 
the Customs Act of 1962 (Customs Act) and the Custom Tariff Act of 1975 
(Custom Tariff Act) on goods imported by Developers for authorized op-
erations;124 and (vi) excise duty under the Central Excise Act of 1944 (Cen-
tral Excise Act) and Central Excise Tariff Act of 1985 (Central Excise Tar-
 
114 Id. § 13(2). 
115 The Central Government has the authority to nominate: (i) a Chairperson, the Devel-
opment Commissioner, (ii) two Members, officers of the Central Government, (iii) two 
members, officers of the Central Government to represent the Ministry or Department deal-
ing with revenue, and (iv) a Member, an officer of the Central Government to represent the 
Ministry of Department dealing with economic affairs.  Id. §§ 11(1), 13(2)(a)–(d). 
116 Id. § 13(2)(e). 
117 Id. § 13(5). 
118 Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006, § 53, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Feb. 10, 
2006), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/SEZ_Rules_July_2010 
.pdf. 
119 Id. § 18(2)(ii). 
120 Special Economic Zones Act, at Second Schedule (Modifications to the Income Tax 
Act of 1961), §(f)(2) (India).  A Developer can only receive the income tax exemption for 
ten consecutive years within fifteen years from the date of commencement of operations in 
the SEZ.  Id. 
121 Id. at Second Schedule (Modifications to the Income Tax Act of 1961), §(h).  This tax 
is levied on companies on the basis of their “book profits” at 7.5%.  PALIT & 
BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 146. 
122 Special Economic Zones Act § 26(1)(e) (India). 
123 Id. § 26(1)(g). 
124 Id. § 26(1)(a). 
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iff Act).125  Additionally, state governments are given the freedom to enact 
any legislation granting Developers exemption from any state taxes, duties, 
or levies.126 
Similarly, Units also receive a set of incentives.  First, Units receive 
fiscal benefits.  Most notably, Units receive an exemption from payment of: 
(i) income tax under Section 10AA of the Income Tax Act;127 (ii) service 
tax under Chapter V of the Finance Act on taxable services provided to a 
Unit;128 (iii) sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act on sale or purchase of 
goods;129 (v) customs duty under the Customs Act and the Custom Tariff 
Act on goods imported and exported by Units for authorized operations;130 
(vi) excise duty under the Central Excise Act and Central Excise Tariff 
Act;131 and (vii) capital gains tax during transfer of assets involved in shift-
ing from urban areas to SEZs.132  Additionally, state governments are given 
the freedom to enact any legislation granting Units exemption from any 
state taxes, duties, or levies.133  Second, SEZs provide Units with possible 
relief from India’s restrictive labor laws.134  While SEZ regulation does not 
overtly exempt Units from labor laws,135 the SEZ Rules empower the De-
velopment Commissioner to “step up with a firm hand in industrial dis-
putes” with a view to continue operations.136  Third, SEZs equip Units with 
 
125 Id. § 26(1)(c). 
126 Id. § 50(a). 
127 Id. at Second Schedule (Modifications to the Income Tax Act of 1961), §(c)(1).  For 
the first five years from commencement of operations, the Unit is exempt from paying in-
come tax on 100% of export profits.  For the next five years, the Unit is exempt from paying 
income tax on 50% of export profits.  For the next five years, the Unit may deduct 50% of 
retained export profits from its income tax liability.  Id. 
128 Id. § 26(1)(e). 
129 Id. § 26(1)(g). 
130 Id. § 26(1)(a)–(b). 
131 Id. § 26(1)(c). 
132 Id. at Second Schedule (Modifications to the Income Tax Act of 1961), §(d)(1).  This 
exemption on capital gains tax requires that one year before or three years after the transfer, 
the Unit (i) purchased machinery or plant for operations in the SEZ, (ii) acquired land or 
building or constructed building for operations in the SEZ, (iii) shifted the original asset and 
transferred establishment of such undertaking to the SEZ, and (iv) incurred expenses on cer-
tain authorized purposes.  Id. 
133 Id. § 50(a). 
134 PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 131. 
135 The SEZ Act does not allow modifications to any of India’s Central Acts or Rules re-
garding trade unions, industrial and labor disputes, welfare of labor, conditions of work, 
provident funds, employers’ liability, workers’ compensation, and maternity benefits.  Spe-
cial Economic Zones Act, § 49(1) (India).  Thus, India’s labor laws “clearly” remain intact in 
SEZs.  PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 131. 
136 PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 131.  The SEZ Rules empower the Devel-
opment Commissioner to declare SEZs as public utility services under the Industrial Dis-
putes Act of 1947.  Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006, § (5)(g), GAZETTE OF INDIA, § 
II(3)(i) (Feb. 10, 2006), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/ 
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modern and convenient “plug and play” infrastructure.137 
III.  DEBATE SURROUNDING SEZS 
Much of the debate about the viability of SEZs in India is rooted in the 
operational framework of SEZs.  Pointing to benefits generated by SEZs, 
proponents of India’s SEZ policy lend support to several legislative and 
regulatory provisions.  Conversely, opponents of the SEZ policy make 
compelling arguments that legislative and regulatory shortcomings render 
the SEZ policy injurious to the national economy. 
A.  Proponents’ Assertions in Favor of SEZs 
Proponents of India’s SEZ policy base their support on three economic 
predictions that have been witnessed in SEZs internationally.138  First, SEZs 
efficiently attract FDI.  Additionally, SEZs promote infrastructural devel-
opment.  Finally, SEZs create employment. 
1.  SEZs Attract FDI 
SEZs are considered “ideal” for attracting FDI.139  The incentives 
SEZs offer to Developers and Units elicit investment from foreign sources.  
As described in the operational framework section above, Developers re-
 
SEZ_Rules_July_2010.pdf.  The Industrial Disputes Act prohibits conditions for strikes and 
lock-outs on employees of public utilities.  Industrial Disputes Act, No. 14 of 1947, §22, 
INDIA CODE (2011) available at http://indiacode.nic.in.  Thus, by being declared as public 
utilities, SEZs will be shielded from strikes and lock-outs. 
137 Nachammai Raman, India Tries to Tame its Red-Tape Jungle, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Jun. 16, 2005), http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0616/p01s04-wosc.htm (readily 
available “plug and play” infrastructure allows expedited and cost-effective establishment of 
Units). 
138 See PRESS INFO. BUREAU, supra note 106 (predicting that SEZs would “trigger a large 
flow of foreign direct investment as well as domestic investment in infrastructure and pro-
ductive capacity leading to creation of new employment opportunities”); see also Herbert 
Jaunch, The Case of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in Namibia, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC 
ZONES: GLOBAL AND INDIAN EXPERIENCES, supra note 82, at 177; Vijaya Katti & Arpita Sub-
hash, SEZ; Case of Mauritius EPZ, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: GLOBAL AND INDIAN 
EXPERIENCES, supra note 82, at 151; Tatsuyuki Ota, Special Economic Zones in China’s 
Economic Development as Compared with Asian Export Processing Zones, in SPECIAL 
ECONOMIC ZONES: GLOBAL AND INDIAN EXPERIENCES, supra note 82, at 71; Anandan Pillai & 
Pheba Anandan Pillai, Shenzhen SEZ; Role Model for Emerging SEZs, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC 
ZONES: GLOBAL AND INDIAN EXPERIENCES, supra note 82, at 134; Pheba Anandan Pillai, 
Comparative Study of Exports Processing Zones’ Performance: India, Sri Lanka and Bang-
ladesh, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: GLOBAL AND INDIAN EXPERIENCES, supra note 82, at 
106; Vandana Singh, Jebel Ali Free Trade Zone: An Oasis in Desert, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC 
ZONES: GLOBAL AND INDIAN EXPERIENCES, supra note 82, at 169. 
139 PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 7.  Typically, FDI is accompanied with 
advanced technology.  Id. at 8.  Thus, as linkages develop between the SEZ and urban areas, 
technology is transferred to urban areas.  Id. 
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ceive a variety of fiscal benefits.140  As additionally explained above, Units 
receive fiscal benefits, relief from India’s restrictive labor laws, and estab-
lished infrastructure.141  Adoption of such free market principles in SEZs 
attracts FDI.142  Empirical evidence supports this hypothesis.  Total FDI in-
flow into SEZs as of March 2008 was `54,900,410,000 (approximately 
$1,073,112,000).143  Additionally, proposed FDI inflow into SEZs was 
`322,273,600,000 (approximately $6,299,327,600).144  These actual and 
proposed FDI inflows are evidence of SEZs’ ability to attract FDI. 
2.  SEZs Promote Infrastructure Development 
SEZs are recognized as “potent instruments for building infrastruc-
ture.”145  By offering fiscal incentives in SEZs, “governments expect private 
Developers to come forward for building infrastructure.”146  Two provisions 
in the operational framework ensure that SEZs will generate such infra-
structural benefits for the Indian economy.147  First, minimum processing 
area requirements compel Developers to build infrastructure on some por-
tion of the land occupied by the SEZ.148  Second, minimum investment re-
 
140 See supra Part II.C. 
141 See supra Part II.C. 
142 See Sumeet Jain, Note, Tightening India’s “Golden Straitjacket”: How Pulling the 
Straps of India’s Job Reservation Scheme Reflects Prudent Economic Policy, 8 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 567, 567 (2009) (“The ‘Golden Straitjacket,’ a set of free market pol-
icies implemented by national governments, is golden because it attracts foreign investors, 
and is a straitjacket because deviation from it will repel foreign investors.”).  See also 
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 89 (1999). 
143 DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUS., INVESTMENT PROPOSED 
AND MADE IN SEZS NOTIFIED UNDER SEZ ACT AS OF 31.3.2008 (2008) (India) [hereinafter 
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUS.], available at http:// 
www.nsez.gov.in/nsezwebsite/Resources/Employemnt/investment-proposed-and-made-in-
sez-notified-under-to-SEZs.pdf.  Of this total FDI, Units have accounted for 
`29,099,710,000 (approximately $568,798,0000) and Developers have accounted for 
`25,800,700,000 (approximately $504,313,920).  Id. 
144 Id.  Of this total proposed FDI inflow, Units have accounted for `111,485,000,000 
(approximately $2,179,143,860) and Developers have accounted for `210,788,600,000 (ap-
proximately $4,120,183,740).  Id. 
145 PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 175.  However, it is important to under-
stand that “SEZs are not instruments for developing backward areas.”  Id. at 173.  In fact, 
“poor locational choices can have disastrous outcomes for these zones.”  Id.  Therefore, “it is 
naïve to assume that generous fiscal incentives will help in overcoming the heavy transaction 
costs of operating in far-flung remote corners of the country.”  Id. 
146 PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 8.  As linkages begin to develop between 
the SEZs and urban areas, infrastructural developments are also expected to occur outside 
the zonal boundaries.  Id. 
147 See ARUNACHALAM, supra note 58, at 21 (predicting that SEZs in India will “offer 
high quality infrastructural facilities and support services”). 
148 See supra text accompanying notes 103–105. 
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quirements induce Developers to invest in infrastructure.149  By requiring 
Developers to meet certain area and financial thresholds regarding devel-
opment of infrastructure, these two stipulations ensure that a significant 
fraction of total investment made in SEZs is devoted to infrastructure.  
Since total investment in SEZs as of March 2008 amounted to a healthy 
`693,495,730,000 (approximately $13,555,428,650),150 India’s SEZ policy 
is expected to bear sizeable investment in infrastructure. 
3.  SEZs Create Employment 
SEZs are noted for their ability to create new employment opportuni-
ties.151  For India, a country with a labor surplus, such employment creation 
is a policy priority.152  SEZs have a dualistic employment generation effect.  
SEZs create direct employment for individuals employed in Units operating 
within the SEZ.153  As of March 2008, SEZs had directly employed 97,993 
individuals154 and proposed direct employment was 2,448,246.155  What is 
more, SEZs create indirect employment for individuals engaged in indus-
tries and services which support the activity within SEZs, such as trucking 
of goods to SEZs.156  As of March 2008, SEZs had indirectly employed 
220,506 individuals and proposed indirect employment was 2,455,196.157  
In all, SEZs have generated substantial employment and are predicted to 
continue generating employment in increasing amounts. 
B.  Opponents’ Arguments Against SEZs 
Opponents of India’s SEZ policy base their contentions on three un-
wanted consequences of the policy.  First, SEZ development leads to unjust 
and inequitable seizure of agrarian land.  Second, land acquisition for SEZs 
promotes underhanded real estate dealing.  Lastly, the Indian government 
will suffer a net financial loss on the SEZ policy. 
 
149 See supra text accompanying notes 106–107. 
150 DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUS., supra note 143.  Total 
investment includes FDI and total domestic investment. 
151 PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 7.  The “employment benefits are particu-
larly strong if the zones promote activities utilizing relatively low-skilled labour, since the 
latter not only comprise bigger chinks of developing economy workforces, but also figure 
dominantly among the poor.”  Id.  However, there are examples of workers being trained for 
upgrading their skills.  Id. at 8.  Thus, SEZs may also contribute to skills development. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 7. 
154 See DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUS., EMPLOYMENT IN SEZS 
NOTIFIED AFTER SEZ ACT, 2005 AS OF 31.3.2008 (2008) (India) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT IN 
SEZS], available at http://www.nsez.gov.in /nsezwebsite/Resources/Employemnt/Emp-in-
Govt-State-private-established-prior-to-SEZs.pdf. 
155 Id. 
156 PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 7. 
157 EMPLOYMENT IN SEZS, supra note 154. 
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1.  SEZs Displace Agrarian Communities 
In a largely agrarian economy,158 it is no surprise that the staunchest 
critics of SEZ policy are those defending the “sacred tie between the tiller 
and the land.”159  Given that agrarian viewpoints were excluded from the 
development of SEZ policy, it is even less of a surprise that agrarian griev-
ances are the fiercest criticisms of the SEZ policy.160  Agrarian communities 
object to SEZs for fear of displacement.  Displacement has two compo-
nents.  First, agrarian communities are losing their land to Developers at 
prices “well below” prevailing market rates.161  Second, along with losing 
their land, these communities lose their livelihoods.162  Ultimately, dis-
placement of agrarian communities banishes them to irrecoverable poverty. 
Due to predicted mass displacement of agrarian communities, India’s 
SEZ policy has been called “one of the greatest land grabs in modern Indian 
history.”163  As of September 2010, SEZ development is set to occupy ap-
proximately 94,000 hectares.164  Total cultivable land area165 at the incep-
tion of SEZ policy in India in 2005 was approximately 182,570,000 hec-
tares.166  While current SEZ development threatens only 0.05% of total 
cultivable land in India, it is estimated that this land acquisition will dis-
place 1,000,000 individuals.167  Accordingly, agrarian resistance to SEZs is 
 
158 The World Factbook—India, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov 
/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) (The agri-
cultural sector accounts for 18.5% of India’s GDP.).  See also ARUNACHALAM, supra note 
58, at 221 (The agricultural sector accounts for 56.7% of the country’s workforce.). 
159 ARUNACHALAM, supra note 58, at 219. 
160 Id. at 220. 
161 Id.; see also Karishma Vaswani, Anger over India’s Special Economic Zones, BBC 
NEWS (Oct. 18, 2006, 10:57 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6054754.stm (Facing 
the prospect of losing his farmland at substandard market prices to Developers, Sadhu Pingre 
Dashrath, a farmer for over 40 years, explains, “[t]hey want to steal it at a fraction of the cost 
it’s worth.”). 
162 Sriram Ananthanarayanan, New Mechanisms of Imperialism in India: The Special 
Economic Zones, 22 SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY 35, 51 (2008) (“Some estimates show that 
there will be only one job created for every four taken away.”). 
163 ARUNACHALAM, supra note 58, at 226. 
164 List of Formal SEZ Approvals Granted, supra note 74 (As of September 2010, 63,684 
hectares had been granted to formally approved SEZs.).  See also List of In-Principal SEZ 
Approvals Granted, supra note 75 (As of September 2010, 30,402 hectares had been granted 
to SEZs that had received in-principal approval). 
165 Cultivable land “consists of net area sown, current fallows, fallow lands other than 
current fallows, culturable waste and land under miscellaneous tree crops.”  DEP’T OF AGRIC. 
& COOPERATION, MINISTRY OF AGRIC. CONCEPTS & DEFINITIONS 3 (India), available at 
http://eands.dacnet.nic.in/PDF_LUS/Concepts_&_Definitions.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 
2011). 
166 India Cultivable Land Falls Marginally, FIN. EXPRESS (Mar. 10, 2008, 3:48 PM), 
http://www.financialexpress.com/news/indias-cultivable-land-fallsmarginally /282603. 
167 Devinder Sharma & Bhaskar Goswami, The New Maharajas of India, 
COUNTERCURRENTS.ORG (Dec. 17, 2006), http://www.countercurrents.org/gl-sharma171206 
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rooted in the reality that even a de minimis impact on the amount of culti-
vable land “is likely to have a deleterious effect on a large number of peo-
ple.” 168 
The current SEZ land acquisition scheme, governed by the heavy-
handed terms of the Land Acquisition Act,169 shoulders the blame for the 
displacement of these agrarian communities.  Promulgated during the colo-
nial era, the Land Acquisition Act retains principles of forcible land seizure 
used under British rule.170  Thus, a transaction under the Land Acquisition 
Act often grants a favorable deal to the acquirer and coerces the seller into 
an unfavorable one.171  Once the government decides that a tract of land is 
needed for “public purpose” or for “a company,” the owner of that land is 
forced in most cases to accept subpar government-determined monetary 
compensation in exchange for his or her land.172  Government-determined 
 
.htm. 
168 Ananthanarayanan, supra note 162, at 53.  It is feared India’s SEZ policy will recreate 
“a scene from a Jetson’s comic, with one part of the country living in growth bubbles high 
above the ground, while below will be the teeming masses, hungry and seething that they are 
not part of that growth.”  Manjeet Kripalani, Townships vs. Naxalism: Which India Will 
Win?, BUS. WK. (May 9, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/blog/eyeonasia/ 
archives/2008/05/townships_vs_na.html. 
169 See supra text accompanying notes 111–112. 
170 Kannan Kasturi, SEZs: A History of Injustice and Abuse, INDIA TOGETHER (Oct. 1, 
2007), http://www.indiatogether.org/2007/oct/eco-sezhist.htm.  The Land Acquisition Act 
was framed with the purpose of legitimizing the colonial British government’s quick, easy, 
and cheap seizure of land.  Id.; see also Land Acquisition Act §4, No. 1 of 1894, INDIA CODE 
(2011), available at http://indiacode.nic.in (the Land Acquisition Act permitted the Indian 
government to acquire land for “public purpose”). To further quick, easy, and cheap seizure 
of land, “public purpose” was left undefined.  Kasturi, supra.  Instead, it was sufficient for 
the government to simply declare “public purpose.” Id.  The end of colonial rule did not 
bring any significant change to India’s land acquisition laws.  Id.  In fact, during the Neh-
ruvian period, the breadth of government land acquisition increased.  Id.  To promote Neh-
ru’s industrialization efforts, land was increasingly being acquired for private industry.  In 
the landmark judgment of R.L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1962) 2 S.C.R. Supl. 149 
(India), the Supreme Court sought to curtail this broadening of land acquisition for public 
purpose.  The Supreme Court held, “[the Land Acquisition Act did not contemplate] that the 
Government should be made a general agent for companies to acquire lands for them in or-
der that the owners of companies may be able to carry on their activities for private profit.”  
Id.  However, the legislature promptly reversed this judicial holding; the 1962 Amendment 
to the Land Acquisition Act allowed the government additionally to acquire land for a com-
pany.  Kasturi, supra. 
171 Kasturi, supra note 170. 
172 Once a tract of land appears to the appropriate government to be needed for a “public 
purpose” or for “a company,” the government may send an officer to conduct a preliminary 
investigation into the area, survey, and value of the land.  Land Acquisition Act, § 4 (India).  
Once a tract of land is declared to be needed for a “public purpose” or for “a company” after 
completion of the preliminary investigation, the appropriate government shall direct a Col-
lector to take order for acquisition of the land.  Id. § 7.  Where applicable, the Collector shall 
hear objections over the area, survey, or value of the land to the Collector.  Id. § 11.  Howev-
er, the Collector’s final assessment into the area, survey, and value of the land overrides any 
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monetary compensation is almost always well below the prevailing market 
rate.173  The result of such transactions forces agrarian communities into a 
disadvantageous position.174 
The fact that SEZs are primarily being established on agricultural land 
intensifies the displacement of agrarian communities.  In principle, SEZs 
can be situated on non-agricultural land.  However, infrastructure in India is 
clustered around agricultural land.  Therefore, establishing SEZs on non-
agricultural land would require a “massive private investment in infrastruc-
ture.”175  In avoiding this investment in new infrastructure by instead estab-
lishing SEZs on agricultural land, Developers have been accused of “piggy-
back[ing] off the existing infrastructure—roads, power, water supply—
assiduously created for agriculture via public investment over the six dec-
ades since independence.”176 
Opponents argue that the land acquisition scheme of India’s SEZ poli-
cy violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India.177  Article 21 declares 
that “no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except ac-
cording to procedure established by law.” 178  In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mu-
nicipal Corp.,179 the Supreme Court of India found that the right to life 
enumerated under Article 21 encompasses the right to livelihood.180  In co-
ercing agrarian communities to sell their land, the Land Acquisition Act 
strips these communities of their means of livelihood.  Therefore, oppo-
nents accuse the SEZ policy of depriving agrarian communities of their 
right to livelihood implicitly contained in Article 21 of India’s Constitution. 
 
objections.  Id. 
173 ARUNACHALAM, supra note 58, at 225.  That recorded transactions invariably under-
value real market rates in India’s land black market only exacerbates the discrepancy be-
tween the government-determined monetary compensation and prevailing market value.  
Kasturi, supra note 170. 
174 ARUNACHALAM, supra note 58, at 226.  The displacement of agrarian communities is 
especially worrisome, as India has historically failed to provide resettlement to displaced 
persons.  Id. at 228. 
175 Aseem Shrivastava, SEZs: The Problem, COUNTERCURRENTS.ORG (Feb. 19, 2008), 
http://www.countercurrents.org/shrivastava190208.htm. 
176 Id. 
177 People’s Memorandum on SEZs in India, supra note 12. 
178 INDIA CONST. art. 21. 
179 (1985) 2 S.C.R. Supl. 51 (India). 
180 Id.  In Olga Tellis, some pavement and slum dwellers in Bombay challenged the deci-
sion of the State of Maharashtra and Bombay Municipal Corporation to forcibly evict them.  
The petitioners’ main argument was that the forcible eviction deprived them of their right to 
livelihood, which is “comprehended in” the right to life contained in Article 21 of the Con-
stitution of India.  The Supreme Court agreed with petitioners’ argument.  The Court ex-
plained, “[t]he right to live and the right to work are integrated and inter-dependent and, 
therefore, if a person is deprived of his job as a result of his eviction from a slum or a pave-
ment, his very right to life is put in jeopardy.”  Id.  Thus, the Supreme Court held that the 
right to life contained in Article 21 does indeed encompass the right to livelihood. 
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2.  SEZs Bring About Underhanded Real Estate Dealings 
Lax land utilization requirements make the SEZ policy susceptible to 
underhanded real estate dealings.  As described in the operational frame-
work section above, in exchange for procuring cheap land under the SEZ 
policy, Developers of various types of SEZs are required to reserve 50% of 
total area for processing activities.181  Once the minimum area for pro-
cessing has been reserved, Developers may utilize the remainder of the area 
for property development.  Many suspect that these lax minimum pro-
cessing area requirements encourage property dealings under the guise of 
SEZ dealings—Developers hoping to acquire cheap land need simply meet 
the minimum processing area requirements then lease182 the remaining land 
at highly profitable rates to make significant profits.183  Early empirical evi-
dence supports this suspicion.  Noida, an SEZ outside Delhi, has witnessed 
real estate speculation caused by spiraling land prices.184  This trend in land 
prices fuels speculation that Developers are earning profits upwards of 
10,000% through underhanded real estate dealings.185 
3.  SEZs Inflict a Financial Loss on Government 
Easily attainable eligibility requirements for Units create a perverse in-
centive for business units to cause a decrease in India’s fiscal revenue by 
relocating from tax-paying urban areas to tax-free SEZs without adequate 
repayment in the form of additional FDI.  As explained in the operational 
framework section above, the SEZ Rules require only that a Unit achieve 
positive net foreign exchange earnings, rather than meeting an export tar-
get.186  This readily attainable requirement creates a perverse incentive for 
business units to relocate from urban areas to SEZs.187  Rahul Bajaj, chair-
man of the Bajaj Group, one of India’s largest business conglomerates, 
agrees that “any rational businessman would conclude he is better off being 
 
181 See supra text accompanying notes 103–105. 
182 The Special Economic Zones Act, No. 28 of 2005, §11(9), INDIA CODE (2011), avail-
able at http://indiacode.nic.in (Developers are not allowed to sell land in an SEZ). 
183 See Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, SEZs: The Good, Bad and Ugly, ECON. TIMES, 
(Aug. 30, 2006, 1:22 AM), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/article show/msid-
1937596,prtpage-1.cms.  Some governmental entities seem to share the suspicion that the 
SEZ policy encourages disguised property dealings.  First, the Central Bank classifies loans 
to SEZs as “real estate” lending.  Id.  Second, former Finance Minister P. Chidambaram 
“obliquely hinted” that SEZs had more to do with real estate than industrial development. 
ARUNACHALAM, supra note 58, at 224. 
184 Ananthanaryanan, supra note 162, at 50. 
185 Shrivastava, supra note 175. 
186 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
187 See Cash Cows, supra note 1.  Even Rahul Bajaj, chairman of Bajaj Auto, a premier 
Indian business conglomerate planning to manufacture in an SEZ, admits that this lax target 
is “too generous.”  Id. at 46. 
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in a [sic] SEZ.”188  Since Units need only achieve positive net foreign ex-
change earnings, these Units, upon meeting their meager foreign exchange 
targets, may continue supplying domestic markets.189  The final result is that 
the Indian government incurs a net financial loss on the SEZ plan by sus-
taining greater losses to tax revenue than gains to FDI.  In fact, empirical 
evidence supports this hypothesis.  The Central Board of Excise and Cus-
toms has estimated that, as of January 2010, India had suffered revenue 
losses because of SEZs of `1,750,000,000,000 (approximately 
$34,206,411,260).190  A collaboration of various Indian government minis-
tries and departments, in turn, has determined that the total FDI inflow into 
SEZs as of the end of 2009 was only approximately `112,000,000,000 
($2.29 billion).191  Given that some of this FDI may have been diverted 
from urban areas to SEZs, the net loss incurred by the government through 
the SEZ plan might be larger than these figures indicate. 
IV.  SUGGESTED REFORMS TO THE SEZ POLICY 
An examination of the proponents’ arguments demonstrates that SEZs 
hold potential to be valuable instruments of economic growth and develop-
ment in India.  However, the resistance arising from the opponents’ con-
cerns limits this potential.  Since much of the resistance facing SEZs stems 
from the operational framework’s inability to address opponent interests, 
legislative and regulatory reforms that make the SEZ policy widely agreea-
ble are necessary for its success.  Such consensus-building reforms will be 
best designed by applying regulatory negotiation, a process in which repre-
sentatives of affected parties collectively develop rules and regulations. 
The most significant advantage offered by regulatory negotiation is the 
“legitimacy benefit.”192  Regulations that have been developed through ne-
gotiation earn greater procedural and substantive legitimacy.  Procedurally, 
a regulation is more likely to earn widespread legitimacy when a greater 
proportion of affected constituents are involved in the process of designing 
the regulation.  The mere act of participating in the design of a regulation 
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deed, “regardless of whether the horse under design turns out to be a five-
legged camel or a Kentucky Derby winner, the resulting rule would have a 
validity” unachievable through regulation that was not negotiated.194  Sub-
stantively, a regulation is more likely to earn widespread legitimacy when it 
is better informed and balanced.  First, the representation of affected con-
stituents facilitates more holistic fact collection.195  In regulation that was 
not negotiated, authorities primarily rely on theoretical information.196  In 
contrast, negotiated regulation allows constituents to present supplemental 
empirical information.197  Such holistic fact collection, in turn, leads to the 
creation of more informed regulations.  Second, the representation of af-
fected constituents reveals the true interests of the parties.  Regulatory ne-
gotiation offers a unique opportunity for constituents to maximize their re-
spective interests by prioritizing interests and making concessions.198  A 
centralized regulatory authority often makes ill-judged concessions, because 
it is unaware of the constituents’ prioritization of interests.199  Regulatory 
negotiation avoids this pitfall by allowing “careful tradeoffs necessary for 
an enlightened regulation.”200  Thus, a more transparent view of the constit-
uents’ interests offers the possibility of more balanced regulations.  More 
substantively informed and balanced regulation, as is promised through 
regulatory negotiation, is less likely to be objectionable.  The legitimacy 
benefit of regulatory negotiation is derived from this procedural and sub-
stantive acceptance. 
It is neither feasible nor prudent to repeal the existing SEZ policy, en-
gage in regulatory negotiation, and reinstate a new SEZ policy.  Neverthe-
less, it is both feasible and prudent to amend the current SEZ policy to ret-
roactively reflect a more negotiation-based approach.  In line with the 
regulatory negotiation approach, this article suggests two sets of legislative 
and regulatory reforms.  The first set of reforms—procedural reforms—
focuses on securing greater opponent involvement in the establishment and 
operation of SEZs.  The second set of reforms—substantive reforms—
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focuses on introducing rules that will further opponent interests through, not 
despite, the establishment and operation of SEZs.  Admittedly many of the-
se suggested reforms diminish the economic incentives investors will expe-
rience in SEZs.  However, this reduction in incentives is a necessary com-
promise to eliminate the more burdensome social barriers and legislative 
and regulatory uncertainty generated by the widespread protests facing 
SEZs. 
A.  Procedural Reforms 
Quelling the popular resistance facing SEZs hinges largely on the im-
plementation of legislative and regulatory reforms that would facilitate 
greater participation of opponents in the establishment and operation of 
SEZs.  First, state governments should exercise greater control over the 
Board.  Second, the Board should engage in a case-by-case determination of 
minimum processing area requirements for prospective SEZs.  Together, 
these procedural measures ensure the involvement of affected state constit-
uents in the establishment and operation of an SEZ.  Furthermore, these 
measures act as a safety valve, providing state constituents the tools to bal-
ance the advantages promised by SEZs against the harm done through dis-
placement of agrarian communities and underhanded real estate dealings. 
1.  Greater State Government Control over the Board 
To address opponents’ concerns over the displacement of agrarian 
communities,201 state governments should have more control over the 
Board, the body regulating the establishment and operation of SEZs.202  In-
sufficient state authority in the establishment and operation of SEZs has 
been listed as a factor for SEZs’ underperformance.203  Thus, increasing 
state governments’ authority in this area is necessary to improve the per-
formance of SEZs. 
Currently, the distribution of authority between the Central Govern-
ment and state governments in establishing and operating SEZs is inversely 
related to the stake each government has in the enterprise.  The Central 
Government has less of a stake than state governments in the establishment 
and operation of an SEZ.  First, because the employment, FDI, and infra-
structural benefits of SEZs occur directly within the state, a state govern-
ment benefits more than the Central Government from the successful estab-
lishment and operation of the SEZ.  Second, because resistance to a 
particular SEZ is typically localized, a state government stands to lose more 
than the Central Government from the establishment and operation of un-
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wanted SEZs.  Yet, the Central Government is able to exert more authority 
than is a state government in the establishment and operation of SEZs, be-
cause the majority of the members on the Board are nominated by the Cen-
tral Government.204  Therefore, although the Central Government stands to 
gain and lose less through SEZs than do state governments, the Central 
Government holds more authority than state governments in establishing 
and operating the SEZ. 
Instead, authority between the Central Government and state govern-
ments in establishing and operating SEZs should be redistributed to reflect 
the stake each government holds.  Redistributing authority requires chang-
ing the composition of the Board to include more state government nomi-
nees than Central Government nominees.  Allowing state governments to 
control decisions of the Board should lead to the establishment and opera-
tion of a greater proportion of successful SEZs.  When deciding to establish 
and operate an SEZ, state governments will be more likely than the Central 
Government to accurately balance the benefits to employment, FDI, and in-
frastructure against the harm of popular resistance.  State governments have 
an incentive to accrue employment, FDI, and infrastructural benefits.  But, 
this incentive is counterbalanced by state governments’ incentive to cater to 
the views of their electorates.  This competing set of interests induces a 
more precise cost-benefit analysis over the establishment and operation of 
an SEZ.  A more accurate analysis should generate a greater proportion of 
popularly-supported SEZs. 
2.  Case-by-Case Determination of Minimum Processing Area 
Requirements 
To address opponents’ concerns over the occurrence of underhanded 
real estate dealings under the guise of SEZ dealings,205 a case-by-case de-
termination of land utilization requirements should supplement existing 
minimum processing area requirements.  The current land utilization re-
quirements—the lax minimum processing area requirements discussed in 
the operational framework section above206—leave the SEZ policy suscep-
tible to underhanded real estate dealings.  Thus, there is a need for more 
stringent land utilization requirements.  However, to avoid undue hardship 
that would result from across-the-board increases in the minimum require-
ments, case-by-case determinations are required. 
Indiscriminately increasing minimum processing area requirements for 
all SEZs will be unduly burdensome upon many Developers.  For example, 
Mukesh Ambani, a prominent Developer, will be unable to develop viable 
SEZs if more stringent minimum processing area requirements are imposed.  
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He explains that to remain competitive with SEZs in Dubai and China in 
attracting international business units, he must offer comparable lease terms 
on the industrial processing area.207  Offering comparable lease terms to the 
SEZs in Dubai and China forces Mr. Ambani, in turn, to incur a loss on the 
industrial processing area.208  Therefore, Mr. Ambani does not derive his 
financial incentive to develop SEZs from leasing the industrial processing 
area.  Rather, Mr. Ambani derives his financial incentive to develop SEZs 
from leasing the non-processing residential area.209  Thus, imposing higher 
minimum processing area requirements for all SEZs will extinguish the fi-
nancial incentive for Developers like Mr. Ambani. 
Instead, a more nuanced system of imposing minimum processing area 
requirements is necessary.  Accordingly, a case-by-case determination of 
minimum processing area requirements will be an effective means of im-
posing more stringent land utilization requirements.  Under this system, up-
per limits for minimum processing area requirements in each type of SEZ 
would be introduced.  A Developer would bear the burden of proposing rea-
sons for being exempted from this upper limit.  Upon reviewing the Devel-
oper’s proposal, the Board would have the freedom to impose a less strin-
gent minimum processing area requirement.  In making this determination, 
the Board would examine the profitability of the SEZ’s processing area: the 
more profitable the non-processing area in comparison to the processing ar-
ea, the lower would be the minimum processing area requirements.  Criti-
cally, however, the Board would not have the freedom to reduce the mini-
mum processing area requirements below existing levels.  A policy in 
which SEZs are by default required to meet stricter land utilization re-
quirements will reduce the scope for underhanded real estate dealings.  At 
the same time, to avoid undue hardship on particular SEZs, case-by-case 
determinations will provide exemptions from this stricter requirement. 
B.  Substantive Reforms 
To effectively reduce popular resistance against India’s SEZs, proce-
dural reforms must necessarily be complemented by substantive reforms 
that transform the SEZ policy into a mutually beneficial initiative.  To 
achieve such acceptance, substantive reforms must take the shape of rules 
that promote opponents’ interests.  To reverse the pressing fear that SEZs 
will displace agrarian communities, employment targets should be imposed 
upon Units, and the inclusion of previous landowners in SEZs’ develop-
ment and operation should be incentivized.  Additionally, to diffuse the 
concern that SEZs will result in financial losses for the government, export 
targets should be imposed upon Units.  This set of substantive safeguards 
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transforms India’s SEZ policy into an initiative that also promotes its oppo-
nents’ interests. 
1.  Employment Targets for Units 
To remedy the displacement of agrarian communities,210 employment 
targets should be imposed upon Units.  Employment targets will reduce 
displacement of agrarian communities by relieving the second component 
of displacement—the loss of livelihoods.211  Thus, the imposition of em-
ployment generation targets upon Units would partly address popular pro-
tests provoked by the loss of livelihoods.  In fact, rather than merely quell-
ing the hostility against SEZs, providing employment benefits to agrarian 
communities may even provide a positive incentive for these communities 
to facilitate the establishment of SEZs. 
One effective scheme for imposing employment targets upon Units 
could be a point scheme modeled upon the Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE) initiative in South Africa.212  Under such a scheme, Units would be 
required to meet a minimum “Community Employment” points threshold to 
be eligible to operate in an SEZ.  Each Unit would accrue points for taking 
various employment-related measures.  For example, Units would accrue 
points for employing individuals from local agrarian communities, and 
could earn additional points for involving these employees in management 
and for developing these employees’ skills.213  Under this scheme, Units 
would have flexibility in deciding which employment-related measures to 
implement to meet the minimum “Community Employment” points thresh-
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old.  Thus, this point scheme will contribute to the employment welfare of 
individuals from local agrarian communities, without imposing rigid em-
ployment-related requirements that would repel investors. 
2.  Incentivizing the Inclusion of Previous Landowners in SEZ 
Development and Operation 
To further remedy the displacement of agrarian communities cited by 
opponents,214 the SEZ land acquisition scheme should be transformed to in-
centivize the inclusion of previous landowners in the development and op-
eration of SEZs.  As expressed in opponents’ views, the current SEZ land 
acquisition scheme, governed by the heavy-handed terms of the Land Ac-
quisition Act, makes little progress in including previous landowners as 
beneficiaries of SEZs.215  Replacing the current SEZ land acquisition re-
gime216 with a land acquisition regime that converts previous landowners 
into stakeholders in the emerging SEZ development will alleviate the dis-
placement of agrarian communities.  Remarkably, this idea has received 
support from both ends of the political spectrum.217  An inclusive SEZ land 
acquisition scheme could take the form of a point system for Developers or 
of a fractional land return system. 
a.  Point System for Developers 
An inclusive SEZ land acquisition scheme could take the form of a 
point system for Developers modeled upon the BEE initiative in South Af-
rica.218  This point scheme for Developers is similar to the point scheme 
suggested above for Units.  Under such a scheme, Developers would be re-
quired to meet a minimum “Community Inclusivity” points threshold to be 
eligible to operate in an SEZ.  Developers would accrue points for taking 
various measures that include previous landowners in the development and 
operation of the SEZ, such as employing these previous landowners, in-
volving them in management, and extending equity ownership to them. 
This point system for Developers addresses both components of dis-
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placement:  inadequate compensation for land and the loss of livelihoods.219 
First, by providing an alternative ownership interest, extending equity own-
ership in SEZs to previous landowners partially rectifies the inadequate 
compensation received for land.  Second, providing employment opportuni-
ties will prevent the loss of livelihoods.  Extending equity ownership pro-
vides the additional benefit of arming previous landowners with an active 
interest in the success of an SEZ.  To ensure that previous landowners 
maintain an active interest in the success of SEZs, Developers should be 
unable to meet the minimum points threshold without extending significant 
equity ownership to previous landowners. 
b.  Fractional Land Return System 
Alternatively, an inclusive SEZ land acquisition scheme could be 
based upon a fractional land return system.  Under this system, once an SEZ 
has been developed, Developers will be required to return a certain fraction 
of the developed land to the previous landowners.220  This system functions 
on the premise that land in an SEZ is far more valuable than agricultural 
land.  Accordingly, although the Developer returns only a fraction of the 
SEZ land to the previous landowner, the value of the returned land in the 
SEZ is expected to exceed the value of the larger agricultural land acquired 
prior to the development of the SEZ.  Thus, the expectation is that both the 
Developer and the previous owners of the SEZ land will benefit from the 
development of the SEZ.  By providing previous landowners with land 
more valuable than what they previously owned, the fractional land return 
system addresses the first component of displacement—inadequate com-
pensation for land.221  Even more, because the previous landowners will 
have an interest in the land in the SEZ, they will have an incentive to max-
imize the value of that land by making the SEZ successful. 
3.  Export Targets for Units 
To mitigate the financial loss incurred by the Government on the SEZ 
policy,222 Units should be subject to meeting export targets.  The current 
SEZ operational framework requires only that Units achieve positive net 
foreign exchange earnings.223  However, to ensure that the fiscal benefits 
available within SEZs are availed of only by Units providing adequate re-
payment in the form of additional FDI, the net foreign exchange target 
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should be replaced with an export target.  An export target would require 
that Units export a significant proportion of their total output.  Since meet-
ing an export target places burdens upon a non-exporting business unit, the 
perverse incentive for business units to relocate from urban areas to SEZs is 
vitiated.  Thus, the Indian economy would be less likely to experience a re-
duction in fiscal revenue without a corresponding gain in FDI. 
CONCLUSION 
SEZs have developed into “possibly the toughest challenge” that Indi-
an policy-makers have faced.224  On one hand, the potential benefits that 
SEZs promise are vital to India’s developing economy.  On the other hand, 
pushing India’s current SEZ mandate against the popular resistance it faces 
bears the risk of dismantling the SEZ policy altogether.  Yet, opinions on 
SEZs need not be so polarized. 
With consensus-building reforms, SEZs are capable of delivering a 
positive-sum outcome.  By employing several of the reforms suggested in 
this article at a micro level and in an informal manner, Navin Raheja, a De-
veloper, smoothly earned approval for his SEZ.225  Understanding the gen-
eral proposition that earning popular approval is critical to the success of 
his SEZ, Raheja hired a local advertising agency to make educational and 
inspirational movies about the SEZ.226  Further, parallel to the suggestion of 
incorporating local concerns when deliberating SEZ proposals by replacing 
the Central Board of Approval with a State Board of Approval,227 Raheja 
acquired a truck loaded with chairs and refreshments to hold impromptu 
discussions about his SEZ proposal with local village councils.228  In addi-
tion, consistent with the proposal of placing employment targets upon 
SEZs,229 Raheja assured the local agrarian communities that his SEZ would 
create jobs for two persons per family.230  Finally, in line with the recom-
mendation to include previous landowners in the development of the 
SEZ,231 Raheja promised to make the previous landowners equity owners.232  
Once Raheja earned the local agrarian communities’ support, the land trans-
fer process was completed within twenty-four hours.233 
Procedural and substantive reforms formally ensuring that all SEZ De-
velopers and Units exhibit the same level of inclusivity as did Raheja in de-
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veloping and operating SEZs would play a vital role in quelling the popular 
resistance facing India’s SEZs.  Therefore, such consensus-building reforms 
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